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Familiarity Bias and the Propensity to Issue Going Concern Opinions 
 
 
Abstract  
This study examines the association between familiarity bias and audit firm judgements using 
going concern opinion modifications. We conjecture that familiarity bias is highest when an audit 
firm is least familiar with its clients.  We measure familiarity bias using auditor changes because 
familiarity bias is likely to be the highest on the initial year of an audit relationship.  We find the 
propensity to issue a going concern modification to be much higher during this initial period, even 
after controlling for a multitude of factors known to be determinants of going concern 
modifications.  Our findings also suggest the phenomenon appears to slowly dissipate over a five-
year auditor client tenure.  Supporting our theoretical prediction, further results find that as the 
auditor is more familiar with the client’s industry (e.g. industry expertise) the main effect is 
moderated.  Our results are also strongest when the successor auditor is located in a different locale 
than the previous auditor, situations leading an even more pronounced lack of familiarity.  We also 
examine SOX 404 internal controls impact, finding auditors are more likely to deem internal 
controls ineffective when they are unfamiliar with clients. 
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I. Introduction  
We examine familiarity bias in relation to audit firm judgements using going concern opinion 
modifications.  We define familiarity bias as a disproportionate weight in favor of those clients 
who auditors have greater knowledge of their business.  Thus, familiarity bias is highest when an 
audit firm is least familiar with its clients.  We measure familiarity bias using auditor changes 
because familiarity bias is likely to be the highest in the initial stages of an audit relationship.  
Familiarity bias has been shown to influence financial market participants’ investment choices 
(Kang and Stulz 1997; Coval and Moskowitz 1999; Huberman 2001; Li 2004; Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner 2005; Massa and Simonov 2006; Nofsinger and Varma 2002; Riff and Yagil 2016; 
and Schumacher 2017).  To date, there has been little research regarding whether familiarity bias 
influences financial market monitors such as auditors.  We conjecture that familiarity bias is 
more likely reflected in auditor’s areas regarding judgment such as issuing going concern 
opinion modifications.   
Going concern opinion modifications are important to financial statement users.  Going concern 
opinion modifications signal a company’s operating uncertainties over the next fiscal year 
(PCAOB 2003).  Auditors’ evaluations of these uncertainties are made based on knowledge 
obtained from audit procedures and knowledge of conditions and events existing at or prior to 
the completion of fieldwork.  The PCAOB Standard Advisory Group Meeting in May 2012 
introduced discussion points for going concern communication and evaluation, including the 
definition of thresholds for substantial doubt, additional details relating to the auditor’s 
conclusion, and required procedures when evaluating going concerns (PCAOB 2012).  While 
regulators consider whether current going concern guidance and standards adequately disclose 
relevant company uncertainties (FASB 2013; PCAOB 2012; Tysiac 2014; PCAOB 2016; 
PCAOB 2017), this study contributes to that discussion because going concern opinion 
modifications require auditors to process complex information, which represents a setting where 
familiarity bias may emerge.  
Prior literature suggests that the auditor client relationship is a determinant for auditors when 
issuing going concern opinion modifications (Carson, Fargher, Geiger, Lennox, Raghunandun, 
and Willekens 2013).  We use changes in auditor as our familiarity bias measure as we 
conjecture that familiarity bias is highest during the first year of an auditor client relationship.  
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Numerous studies document auditor changes in the year after clients receive going concern 
opinion modifications (Chow and Rice 1982; Smith 1986; Geiger, Raghunandan, and Rama 
1998, Lennox 2000, Carcello and Neal 2003, Vanstraelen 2003; Chan, Lin, and Mo 2006).  
However, the literature does not examine whether switching auditors impacts the probability that 
a client will receive a going concern opinion modification (Chow and Rice 1982; Krishnan 1994; 
Krishnan and Stephens 1995; Krishnan and Krishnan 1996; Geiger, Raghunandan, and Rama 
1998, Lennox 2000, Carcello and Neal 2003).  Lennox (2000) predicted going concern opinon 
modifications that clients would have received if they had changed auditors opposite to those that 
actually did.  Carson et al. (2013) call for additional research to further understand the auditor 
client interaction and going concern opinion issuance.  Thus, examining auditors’ familiarity bias 
in relation to the propensity to issue going concern opinons informs the literature about whether 
auditors’ judgments regarding complex data assessed when contemplating a going concern 
opinion are biased when the auditors are least familiar with the client. 
Prior auditor judgment literature suggests that auditors refer to long-term memory on 
engagements that involve consideration of further evidence to make decisions (Plumlee 1985, 
Mocckel and Plumlee 1989). This finding relies on the premise that auditors use long-term 
memory to store evidence gathered for particular clients. Tan (1995) suggests that auditor 
changes reduce the tendency to focus on more consistent facts arising from repeat engagements.  
For first time engagements, the resulting absence of this long-term memory from repeat 
engagements gives rise to a lack of familiarity and the bias that ultimately accompanies it. 
Using a sample of companies from 2008-2017, we examine whether than is an association 
between familiarity bias and the propensity to issue going concern opinions.  We find a positive 
association between switching auditors and the likelihood of issuing a going concern opinion.  
Specifically, we find that a change in auditor increases the likelihood of going concern opinion 
by 1.5%. We find a monotonic decline in the probability of going concern as the auditor becomes 
more familiar with the client (i.e., the tenure period lengthens).  Our results contradict prior 
findings that suggest a positive association between auditor tenure and the propensity to issue a 
going concern opinion prior to bankruptcy (Geiger and Raghunandan 2002).  Additionally, we 
find this effect is highest when the client firm switches both the audit firm and auditor location.  
This main effect is also amplified when auditors have little to no industry expertise, another 
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setting whereas familiarity bias is likely to be pronounced.  Finally, we also find that auditors are 
more likely to deem internal controls ineffective when they are unfamiliar with clients. 
Our results are robust to using numerous client level financial controls, different econometric 
models and specifications, and different methods to compute standard errors. In additional 
sensitivity tests that include auditor and client-level fixed effects, as well as the inclusion of the 
prior period’s going concern decision, our results continue to suggest a positive association 
between familiarity bias and issuance of going concern opinions. 
Investigating the effect of familiarity bias on the auditors’ propensity to issue going concern 
opinions and deem internal controls ineffective contributes to several streams of literature. First, 
this study contributes to the literature on auditor switching and opinion shopping. Prior studies 
are inconclusive regarding whether changing auditors removes the going concern opinion.  We 
provide evidence that opinion shopping is less successful because a change in auditor introduces 
a familiarity bias that leads to higher probability of issuing a going concern opinion.  Second, we 
extend the familiarity bias literature by providing evidence that the familiarity heuristic expands 
beyond investors to an important financial market monitor, auditors. Finally, we contribute to the 
extant literature on auditor judgments by providing evidence on the effect of familiarity bias and 
evidence suggesting that auditors’ decisions regarding complex information are affected by the 
auditors’ experience with clients.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes familiarity bias, auditor 
judgment, going concern opinion, and internal control effectiveness literature and develops the 
hypotheses. Section III describes the research methodology and results. Section IV provides 
additional robustness results. Section V provides the conclusion.        
II. Background and Hypotheses Development 
A. Going Concern Overview 
A going concern opinion is a signal of substantial doubt about a company’s ability to operate 
beyond one year based on evidence obtained during the audit (PCAOB 2003). It is the auditors’ 
responsibility to continuously evaluate companies’ immediate viability and inform external 
stakeholders of this operating uncertainty through the independent auditor’s report. Auditors 
issue a modified audit report containing a going concern explanatory paragraph when the audit 
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firm concludes there is substantial doubt that companies will survive the next financial year.  In 
order to determine whether there is substantial doubt regarding survival, auditors use judgment 
when evaluating both financial and non-financial information, such as strategic initiatives and 
mitigating factors. 
Although the going concern opinion signals uncertainty, questions continue to exist about 
whether audit firms and companies adequately disclose information about operating uncertainties 
(PCAOB 2016; PCAOB 2012; FASB 2013; PCAOB 2015a; FASB 2016). Recent enhancements 
to management’s disclosures as well as the PCAOB’s continued discussion about going concern 
requirements suggest that management and audit firm communications with investors do not 
adequately inform investors about the uncertainty surrounding companies operations.  The ability 
to accurately identify a company with a going concern issue is critical for external stakeholders 
evaluating companies’ financial condition (U.S. House of Representatives 2002). 
B. Familiarity Bias 
Familiarity bias is a common heuristic individuals use to help categorize data and make decisions 
when analyzing large amounts of complex information.  Familiarity is evidenced to lead 
individuals to assign greater value to more familiar options (Fox and Levav 2000).  Fox and 
Levav (2000) find that individuals are biased to view less familiar events as less likely to occur.  
Based on these finding, we suggest familiarity bias may lead auditors to issue going concern 
audit opinion modifications in the year clients switch to new auditors.  Prior research suggests 
familiarity bias is associated with binary choice inferences.  Specifically, individuals are 
predicted to infer that the more familiar object in a pair has a higher criterion value on the to be 
judged dimension (Honda, Abe, Matsuka, Yamagishi 2010).  Extending these results to our study 
suggests that auditors who are more familiar with their clients are more likely to not issue going 
concern audit opinion modifications.  Thus, when auditors assess going concern opinion 
modifications in the initial year the client switched auditors, familiarity bias may lead to a higher 
probability of issuing going concern opinion modifications. 
The majority of familiarity bias research within capital markets has focused on investment 
choices (Huberman 2001; Ivkovic and Weisbenner 2005; Nofsinger and Varma 2002; Riff and 
Yagil 2016; and Schumacher 2017).  Huberman (2001) finds that investors are more likely to 
hold shares in the phone company that services them, and Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) 
6 
 
suggest that investors disproportionately hold companies that are headquartered within 250 miles 
of their home.  Further research examined whether professional fund managers would be less 
prone to exhibit familiarity bias. The findings provide evidence that sophisticated investors also 
exhibit familiarity bias (Schumacher 2017, Riff and Yagil 2016, Nofsinger and Varma 2012).   
Thus, as a whole, financial market participants seem to assign greater (less) value to those firms 
with which they are familiar (unfamiliar).  Additionally, credit rating agencies are evidenced to 
exhibit familiarity bias.  Ayres and Dolvin (2019) suggest first time credit ratings are lower 
because the credit rating agencies are less familiar with companies during the initial rating 
process.  We extend the familiarity bias literature stream specific to capital markets by 
examining familiarity bias in relation to financial markets’ monitors, auditors.  
C. Auditor Judgment and Decisions 
Auditor judgment is critical for decisions regarding uncertainty that lead to going concern 
opinion modifications.  Prior literature documents that long-term memory on engagements that 
involve consideration of further evidence to make decisions impacts auditors’ judgment (Plumlee 
1985, Moeckel and Plumlee 1989). This finding relies on the premise that auditors use long-term 
memory to store evidence gathered for particular clients. Tan (1995) finds that auditor changes 
reduce the tendency to focus on more consistent facts arising from repeat engagements.  For 
initial audit engagements, the resulting absence of this long-term memory from repeat 
engagements gives rise to a lack of familiarity and the bias that ultimately accompanies it. 
Prior research documents that auditors’ judgments are affected by biases (Trotman Tan Ang 
2011).  Peecher and Piercey (2008) consider the evaluation of audit quality when adverse 
outcomes exist and find adverse outcomes could bias individual judgments.  Going concern 
opinion modifications are adverse audit outcome and an audit quality measure (PCAOB 2015b).  
We extend the literature to examine whether familiarity bias are associated with uncertainty 
judgments related to issuing going concern opinion modifications.   
D. Determinants of Going Concern Opinions 
Prior research documents associations between auditor switching and going concern opinion 
modifications.  The prevailing evidence documents a relationship between auditors issuing going 
concern opinion modifications and clients switching auditors (e.g., Chow and Rice 1982; Smith 
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1986; Geiger et al. 1998; Lennox 2000; Carcello and Neal 2003; Vanstraelen 2003; Chan et al. 
2006).  However, Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) findings support fewer clients dismiss their 
auditors following going concern opinion modifications in the post-SOX era.  Our study differs 
from this stream of research because we are examining the propensity to issue a going concern 
opinion modification in the year a client changes auditors.  An unresolved question in the 
literature is whether switching auditors is successful in terms of removing the going concern 
opinion modification, which is often referred to as opinion shopping.  Early research establishes 
no association between switching auditors and subsequent improvements in audit opinions 
(Chow and Rice 1982; Krishnan 1994; Krishnan and Stephens 1995; Krishnan and Krishnan 
1996; Geiger et al. 1998).  Lennox (2000) does not examine actual auditor switch decisions; 
instead he analyzes opinion shopping by predicting the opinions that clients would have received 
if they made switch decisions opposite to those that actually occur.  Lennox (2000) suggests that 
clients would have received less favorable audit opinions if clients made switch decisions 
opposite to those actually observed.  Our measure of familiarity bias is clients that choose to 
switch auditors.  We examine whether familiarity bias is associated to going concern opinion 
modifications in the initial year that clients make the decision to switch auditors. Our study 
contributes to the inconclusive evidence between auditor switching and going concern opinion 
modifications. 
A related stream of literature examines auditor-client tenure as a determinant for issuing going 
concern opinion modifications.  Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) find a positive association 
between auditor tenure and the propensity to issue going concern opinion modifications prior to 
bankruptcy.  Read and Yezegel (2016) examine bankrupt clients and find no association between 
going concern opinion modifications and auditor tenure for Big 4 audit firms.  Their results 
document non-Big 4 firms are less likely to issue going concern opinion modifications in initial 
audit years.  Given competing arguments suggesting whether auditor tenure is associated with 
the likelihood of issuing going concern opinion modifications, we state the following hypothesis 
in the null: 
H1: Audit firms’ familiarity bias is not associated with the likelihood of issuing going-
concern opinion modifications. 
III. Methodology and Results 
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A. Sample and Data 
Our data is obtained from two primary datasets.  Going concern opinions, internal control 
opinions and audit fees information were obtained in separate files from the Audit Analytics Inc. 
databases.  Our financial controls data primarily comes from the Compustat North American 
annual financial statement filings database.   
We limit our analysis to all opinions rendered on financial statements ending in the calendar 
years 2008 through 2017.  This sample time period is chosen for a couple of reasons.  First of all, 
it begins well after demise of Arthur Andersen and the inception of Sarbanes Oxley (SOX), as 
both caused a considerable amount of upheaval within the auditing industry.  Starting the sample 
in 2008 potentially allows to avoid unusual behavior that may have occurred as a result of these 
two events.  It also allows for internal control audits and Section 404 work to be fully 
implemented as a part of our analysis; internal control audit outcomes have been shown to have 
an influence upon going concerns (Goh et al. 2013).  The period of upheaval just before the 
implementation of SOX led to a drastic change in auditor behavior (Fargher and Jiang 2008; 
Feldmann and Read 2010; Geiger et al. 2005; DeFond and Lennox 2011). 
The second primary reason for our sample period is that 10 years allows for a full economic 
cycle to manifest in the data.  Our sample period includes the severe recession and financial 
crisis that began in 2008, the subsequent recovery, and the better economic years later in the 
sample.  Going concern opinions are highly linked to the health of the overall economy; our 
sample is generalizable as it contains all states of the economy.   
Only those observations for which all variables are populated are retained in the sample.  This 
results in an overall sample size of 35,188 firm-years for our primary sample.  This also results 
in 6,720 unique audit client firms and 598 unique audit firms within our sample. 
B. Econometric Model 
To test our primary hypothesis, whether a change in auditor leads to a higher likelihood of a 
going concern opinion, we employ the following probit1 regression model: 
                                                 
1 We employ a probit model as our dependent variable is binary in nature.  In all of our tests, we also employ a 
linear probability model (i.e., OLS) to ease in interpretation and to test the robustness of the latent assumptions 
within the probit model.  We also employ logistic regression in our robustness testing. 
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 GCit = λ0 + λ1 SWITCHit + λ2 LN_AGEit + λ3 LN_ATit + λ4 ABNORMAL_FEES_PCTit   
 + λ5 CLIENT_IMPORTANCEit + λ6 LEVERAGEit + λ7 LOSSit + λ8 ROAit  
+ λ9 INT_COVERAGEit + λ10 GROWTHit + λ11 CURRENT_RATIOit  
+ λ12 MKTBKit + λ13 ALTMANit + λ14 INVESTMENTSit + λ15 BIGNit  
+ λ16 IC_INEFFECTIVEit + λ17 LN_IND_CLIENTSit + µit234 
GCit is the dependent variable and takes a value of zero if the audit firm did not make a going 
concern modification to the annual audit report.  If such a modification was made, then this 
variable takes the value of one.  This variable was obtained from the Audit Analytics Inc. 
opinions database.  In formulating this variable, we restricted our data to only going concern 
opinions attached to annual form 10-K, 10-K405, 10KSB, 10KSB40, and 10-KT filings.  We also 
restricted our data to the first initial filing for an audit client’s fiscal year.  This treatment avoids 
the incorporation of going concern opinions on amended filings at a later date. 
Our primary variable of interest is SWITCHit.  It measures whether there was a change in the 
audit firm from the prior year to the current year and takes the value of one if this is the case, 
zero otherwise.5  A positive coefficient loading for λ1 would suggest that a change in audit firm 
increases the likelihood of a going concern opinion while a negative loading would indicate the 
opposite.   
We also incorporate several controls to control for potential omitted variable bias as our variable 
of interest is not randomly induced.  We control for both the age of the audit client firm , 
LN_AGEit, (Knechel and Vanstraelen 2007) and the size of the audit client firm, LN_ATit 
                                                 
2 Despite their common use in accounting research, industry and year fixed effects are not included in our primary 
regression specification.  This is done because the predominant research regarding going concern opinions does not 
employ them (Bhaskar et al. 2017; DeFond et al. 2002; Carey and Simnett 2006; Blay and Geiger 2013).  In our 
analyses, however, we do include them for robustness purposes. 
3 We cluster our standard errors at the audit firm client level.  We do not employ two-way clustering as our primary 
mode of analysis given concerns about the depth of our panel data set (i.e., 10 years) (Petersen 2009).  We do 
perform two-way clustering in our robustness tests. 
4 To limit the influence of statistical outliers of our continuous variables, we winsorized those variables at the 1% 
and 99% levels. 
5 We acknowledge that our measurement of auditor switches could mistakenly identify situations where the audit 
firm appears to change but in reality it was acquired. To the extent this exists within the dataset, this situations 
would create a form of bias for our main hypothesis test and it would bias against finding a result.  Merger situations 
where the audit team / partner remained the same would not likely impact familiarity bias. 
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(Carcello and Nagy 2004; Carey and Simnett 2006; DeFond et al. 2002; Lim and Tan 2008).  
The age of the audit client is measured using the natural log of the years (plus one) since the firm 
first went public.  The size of the audit client is measured using the natural log of the book value 
of its assets as of the end of the fiscal year. 
Both audit and non-audit fees have long been hypothesized to influence audit outcomes 
(Basioudis et al. 2008; Blay and Geiger 2013; Lim and Tan 2008; Robinson 2008); we thus 
incorporate two fees related variables.  The first is ABNORMAL_FEES_PCTit and it measures 
the total actual client fees as a percentage of expected total fees.  It is produced by regressing the 
natural log of total fees upon the other covariates in the econometric model and then predicting 
an outcome.  Dividing the actual amount of fees by the predicted level of fees gives our 
measurement.  This is done because if fees do influence reporting outcomes, it is most likely to 
manifest for the most lucrative clientele.6  The second fees related variable is 
CLIENT_IMPORTANCEit.  It is measured as the observation’s total fees as a percentage of the 
auditor’s total fees for that given calendar year.  Similar to abnormal fees, auditor judgement and 
independence may break down as a client becomes more important to the audit firm (Li 2009).  
This may change going concern reporting behavior. 
We also include a bevy of financial performance related controls as the going concern opinion is 
heavily influence by financial outcomes.  The first of these is LEVERAGEit and measures the 
audit client’s exposure to financial leverage; financial leverage increases the risk of bankruptcy 
for a firm.  It is measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (DeFond et al. 2002).  The 
second of these variables is LOSSit (Bruynseels and Cardinaels 2014).  Suffering a net loss, 
through the correlated loss of cash flow, increases bankruptcy risk.  It is measured as a binary 
variable equal to one if the observation had negative net income for the year ended.  The third 
financial control variable is ROAit.  The higher a firm’s return on assets, the lower its bankruptcy 
risk, ceteris paribus.  This variable is measured as net income before special items as a 
percentage of total assets.  The fourth financial control variable is INT_COVERAGEit.  It 
measures a firm’s ability to meet its interest obligations as this ability reduces bankruptcy risk.  It 
                                                 
6 This is also done out of statistical practicalities.  Total fees or the natural log thereof are highly related to both the 
size and the age of a firm, two variables already included in the model.  This technique effectively orthogonalizes 
fees to the other variables in the model, reducing complications that might arise from multicollinearity. 
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is measured as interest expense as a percentage of net income before interest and taxes.7  The 
fifth financial control variable is GROWTHit.  It measures the percentage change in revenue for 
the client firm from the previous year.8  Growth has an impact on financial performance and 
going concern reporting (Johnson et al. 2002).  The sixth financial control variable is 
CURRENT_RATIOit and is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities.  This essentially 
measures the liquidity of the client firm and liquidity is often associated with a diminished 
chance of bankruptcy, especially in the short term.  The seventh financial control is MKTBKit 
(Johnson et al. 2002).  It is measured as the ratio of the market value of equity and liabilities to 
the book value of assets (e.g., equity and liabilities).  Ceteris paribus, firms with higher market 
values typically are thought to have brighter futures while depressed values are potential signals 
of future financial difficulties.  The eighth financial control is ALTMANit (Altman 1968) and is 
used to measure financial distressed.  Financial distress measures such as Altman and Zmijewski 
(Zmijewski 1984) have been prominent aspect of modeling going concern behavior (Bhaskar et 
al. 2017; Carcello and Neal 2000, 2003; DeFond et al. 2002; Johnson et al. 2002).  The ninth 
financial control is INVESTMENTSit.  It is measured as the ratio of cash and short – term 
investments as a percentage of total assets.  Similar to the current ratio, it is another measure of 
liquidity and a proxy for risk of bankruptcy. 
We also control for some auditor characteristics as these might also impact the going concern 
decision.  The first of these is BIGNit.  This is a binary variable equal to one if the current year 
auditor is one of the “big four” accounting firms.  The size of the auditor has been associated 
with the propensity to issue a going concern (Boone et al. 2010; Kaplan and Williams 2012).  
The second auditor characteristic control is IC_INEFFECTIVEit.  This is also a binary variable 
equal to a one if the auditor deemed the client’s internal control to be ineffective in its opinion 
about the operating effectiveness of internal control.  Such instances have been documented to 
more likely result in going concern opinions (Goh et al. 2013; Hammersley et al. 2012).  The 
final control for auditor characteristics is LN_IND_CLIENTSit.  It is measured as the natural log 
                                                 
7 This measurement is opposite of conventional ways to measure this construct.  However, by placing interest 
expense in the numerator, we avoid missing observations that might arise from have a zero denominator observation 
for firms that do not have interest expense.  It is important to keep these types of firms in the sample as they are 
usually among the healthiest and are less likely to receive a going concern opinion. 
8 Revenues are employed here instead of profits to avoid the complications that arise from computing growth for 
negative numbers. 
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of the number of clients the audit firm has within that particular two digit SIC code for the given 
calendar year.  Industry specialization and industry expertise have been shown to impact audit 
outcomes (Reichelt and Wang 2010). 
C. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for our primary sample of 35,188 firm-years.  
Columns 1, 2, and 3 detail the mean, median, and standard deviation of each variable for the 
entire sample.  Going concern opinions occur in approximately 9.2% of all observations.  This is 
slightly higher than the rate (8%) noted by DeFond et al. (2002), but our period incorporates the 
financial crisis while theirs does not.  Changes in auditors occur in approximately 8.3% of all 
observations.  Approximately 56% of all observations are audited by one of the “big four” 
auditors and 2.8% of the observations are deemed to have some aspect of ineffective internal 
controls.  The average client is 4.2% of the audit firms public client base, but the median value is 
only 0.01, which reflects the vast differences in client portfolios between the “big four” audit 
firms and the smaller auditors who undertake public company audits. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Columns 4 and 5 divide the sample into two groups.  The first group (Column 4) is the 
observations for which no change in auditor occurred.  The second group (Column 5) are the 
observations for which a change in auditor did occur.  Both columns display the average value 
for each variable and Column 6 computes the difference between the two sub samples.  Column 
7 applies difference in means t-tests to determine if the two sub-samples are statistically different 
from one another.  With the exception of CURRENT_RATIOit, all variables exhibit statistical 
differences between the two sub-samples.  Most pertinent of these is the difference in going 
concerns between the two sub-samples; client firms incurring a switch in auditor receive going 
concern opinions in 22% of the observations compared to only 8.1% of client firms not incurring 
a change in auditor.  This difference is statistically different at the p-value < 0.01 level.  This 
univariate analysis does provide some support for our main hypothesis.  However, as the other 
variables indicate, substantial differences exist between the two subsamples; thus, a more 
rigorous multivariate analysis is warranted to control for these other factors that may influence 
the likelihood of a going concern opinion.  This is especially important for the nine financial 
control variables included in the analysis.  
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Table 2 displays the univariate pairwise correlation coefficients between all of the variables in 
our main research design.  Any statistically significant relations (p-value < 0.10) are displayed in 
bold italics.  Of particular interest should be the univariate relation between a change in auditor 
and the instance of a going concern opinion.  The correlation coefficient between SWITCHit and 
GCit is positive and statistically significant.  Similar to Table 1, this suggests that a significant 
univariate relation exists between the two, providing further evidence to support our main 
hypothesis.  However, GCit is also positively linked to several other variables that are also 
positively correlated with SWITCHit.  This also supports the notion for more rigorous 
multivariate analyses in our primary hypothesis test(s). 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
D. Multivariate Analysis 
Table 3 details the results of our primary hypothesis tests.  Table 3 is arranged into five columns.  
The first column displays our econometric model using probit regression without the inclusion of 
our variable of interest, SWITCHit.
9  Columns 2 and 3 continue the probit regression analysis, 
introducing SWITCHit.  Column 2 omits industry and time period fixed effects, as is common in 
going concern opinion research (DeFond et al. 2002; Bhaskar et al. 2017), but Column 3 includes 
them for robustness purposes.  Columns 4 and 5 replicate Columns 2 and 3 with the exception 
that the probit regression specification has been replaced with a linear regression specification 
(e.g., OLS).  All standard errors throughout the table are clustered at the audit client firm level.10   
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
In Column 1 the direction of the results for the control variables is consistent with our 
expectations.  Going concern opinions are less likely for older firms (LN_AGEit), larger firms 
(LN_ATit), more profitable firms (ROAit), firms where interest expense is a lower proportion of 
earnings before interest and taxes (INT_COVERAGEit), firms with more liquidity 
(CURRENT_RATIOit, INVESTMENTSit), firms with higher relative market values (MKTBKit) and 
                                                 
9 All specifications within this table are robust to using a logit model in lieu of a probit model.  The SWITCH 
coefficients for Columns 2 and 3 become 0.391 and 0.449, respectively.  The z-statistics become 5.36 and 6.01, 
respectively.  
10 The specifications within this table are also robust to two-way clustering over the audit client firm and time 
dimensions, despite the relatively short panel window (10 years).  For instance, the coefficient in Column 2 becomes 
0.200 and the z-statistic becomes an even stronger 9.03. 
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for firms whereas the auditor has higher industry expertise (LN_IND_CLIENTSit).  Receiving a 
going concern opinion is more like when financial leverage is high (LEVERAGEit), the client 
firm is incurring a net loss (LOSSit), the client firm is growing rapidly (GROWTHit), the auditor 
is a “big four” auditor (BIGNit), and the client firm has been deemed to have deficient internal 
controls (IC_INEFFECTIVEit). 
Overall, the results in columns 2 through 5 support our predictions for the main hypothesis.  The 
coefficient for SWITCHit is positive and highly significant for all four of the model 
specifications. Interestingly, the results are slightly stronger once industry and time period fixed 
effects are included in the model, despite the fact that both changes in auditors and going 
concerns are likely to both be more prevalent in certain time periods and industries (e.g., housing 
construction in 2008 and 2009)11.  For the most part, the control variables also hold their original 
relations to the dependent variable from Column 1 throughout these four analyses.  Our 
hypothesis is thus supported and the evidence suggests that familiarity bias, or lack thereof, can 
play a role in auditor’s going concern determinations. 
The economic significance of these results is even more pronounced.  The rudimentary ordinary 
least squares results in Columns 4 and 5 suggest that a change in auditor alone raises the 
probability of a going concern opinion by 3.0% and 3.1%, respectively.  Since economic 
interpretation of the magnitude of nonlinear models such as the probit and logit models is 
difficult to do directly, we also employ an average marginal effect analysis (untabulated) to 
Columns 2 and 3).  When this is performed, the coefficients transform into 0.015 and 0.016, 
respectively.  This suggests a change in auditor, after controlling for all of the other items that 
may affect a going concern opinion, increases the likelihood of a going concern opinion by 1.5% 
and 1.6%.  While approximately half of the value of the results from the ordinary least squares 
models in Columns 4 and 5, these are still substantial effects.  This is particularly significant 
given the overall low rate of going concern opinions within the sample (9.2% from Table 1).  
The ordinary least squares regressions suggest an average increase of 33.7% (3.1% / 9.2%) to the 
unconditional probability of a going concern opinion while the probit regressions suggest an 
average increase of 17.4% (1.6% / 9.2%).  Given the substantial economic implications of 
                                                 
11 We compute industry fixed effects using two digit SIC codes and time period fixed effects are performed by using 
the calendar year of the last day of the financial statements. 
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receiving a going concern opinion (Chen and Church 1996; Kaplan and Williams 2013; 
Willenborg and McKeown 2000; Allen D. Blay et al. 2011)12, these results are economically 
meaningful. 
We continue our analysis in Table 4.  If the phenomenon we are documenting in Table 3 is real, 
then we should expect to see the effect moderate over time.  Our econometric model in Table 3 is 
too coarse to detect any tapering off since a single binary variable is the variable of interest.  To 
do this, modify the analysis in Table 3 (Columns 2 through 5) and replace SWITCHit with four 
binary variables to capture a more nuanced analysis.  These are FIRST_YEARit, 
SECOND_YEARit, THIRD_FOURTH_YEARit, and FIFTH_SIXTH_YEARit.  FIRST_YEARit is 
essentially the same measurement as SWITCHit, it is equal to one if the observation is the first 
year for the auditor-client relationship.  SECOND_YEARit is equal to one if it is the second year 
of the relationship, THIRD_FOURTH_YEARit is equal to one if it is the third or fourth year and 
FIFTH_SIXTH_YEARit is equal to one if it is the fifth or sixth year.  All other observations fall 
into the intercept. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
To the extent that familiarity bias decreases with time, we should see our main effect moderate 
through each of the coefficients for these variables.  The results of Table 4 appear to support this 
notion.  For instance, in Columns 1, the coefficients for these variable begin at 0.126 for 
FIRST_YEARit and proceed to fall in a monotonic sense to 0.087, 0.044 and -0.038 for 
SECOND_YEARit, THIRD_FOURTH_YEARit, and FIFTH_SIXTH_YEARit, respectively.   A very 
similar pattern emerges in Column 2 with the inclusion of industry and time period fixed effects. 
Since these two columns are the result of a probit analysis, direct comparisons of the coefficients 
is extremely difficult since probit coefficients are not cardinal in nature.    As a result, we 
compute both the average marginal effects for these results as well as statistically test the 
differences between the coefficients.    The average marginal effects for Column 1 are 0.009 
(FIRST_YEARit), 0.006 (SECOND_YEARit), 0.003 (THIRD_FOURTH_YEARit) and -0.003 
                                                 
12 Such economic implications include 1) substantial investor price reactions to a going concern opinion or a 
lessened reaction to a bankruptcy announcement after receiving a going concern opinion, 2) changed investor 
behavior to how they use the financial statements and what information they deem valuable, 3) the delisting of an 
initial public offering, and 4) reduced exposure to litigation costs for the auditor. 
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(FIFTH_SIXTH_YEARit).  Average marginal effects for Column 2 are similar, 0.013, 0.010, 
0.005, and -0.001 respectively.  The results of Columns 3 and 4 also support the results of 
Columns 1 and 2.  Overall, this supports a pronounced monotonic decline in the probability of a 
going concern as the auditor becomes more familiar with the client firm.   
Statistical tests of the differences between these coefficients also support this finding.  A chi-
squared test of FIRST_YEARit = SECOND_YEARit does not yield statistical differences for either 
column (chi-squared = 0.98, 0.93), but the FIRST_YEARit coefficients are statistically different 
from the THIRD_FOURTH_YEARit (chi-squared = 3.47, 5.48) and the FIFTH_SIXTH_YEARit 
(chi-squared = 9.05, 13.37) coefficients.  The SECOND_YEARit coefficient is not statistically 
different from the THIRD_FOURTH_YEARit coefficient (chi-squared = 1.10, 2.49) but is 
different from the FIFTH_SIXTH_YEARit (chi-squared = 5.31, 8.84) coefficient.  Also, the 
THIRD_FOURTH_YEARit coefficient is statistically different (chi-squared = 3.17, 4.52) from the 
FIFTH_SIXTH_YEARit coefficient.  Overall, these results support the notion of gradual changes 
in familiarity bias as the length of the auditor / client relationship increases over time. 
If familiarity bias is a root cause of the results in Table 3, it is likely stronger in certain settings 
and weaker in others.  Tables 5 and 6 obtain insight on such settings.  One such situation might 
be cases where as the audit firm stays the same but perhaps a different office takes on the 
engagement.  Another situation might be where the auditor changes and another auditor from a 
different city takes on the engagement.  We would expect familiarity bias to be lowest when a 
different office of the same auditor conducts the audit, increasing when a new auditor in the 
same city takes on the engagement, and being highest when a new auditor from a different city 
takes on the engagement.  The city is important because the geographic locale can convey a bevy 
of information to the auditor about the client and reduce familiarity bias.   
In Table 5 we create three new variables to capture these potential outcomes and they displace 
SWITCHit from Table 3.  The first is AUDITOR_SWITCHit .  This is a binary variable equal to 
one if the audit firm changed from the prior year, but the successor audit firm was from the same 
geographic city, zero otherwise.  The second new variable is OFFICE_SWITCHit.  It is also a 
binary variable and is equal to one if the audit firm did not change from the prior year but the 
office of the audit firm did, zero otherwise.  The third new variable is DUAL_SWITCHit.  It is a 
binary variable equal to one only if the audit firm changed from the prior year and the office of 
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the successor firm is from a different city than the prior audit firm.13  Table 5 thus mimics Table 
3 but with these three variables replacing SWITCHit. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
The results in Table 5 are interesting and support our notions in regard to familiarity bias being 
more pronounced in certain settings.  In the probit models of Columns 1 and 2, 
AUDITOR_SWITCHit is positive and significant in Column 2.  This suggests going concern 
opinions are more likely when there is a change in auditor, even if the successor auditor is from 
the same locale.  OFFICE_SWITCHit is also positive but statistically insignificant.  As a result, 
we cannot determine if a change in auditor office has any impact on familiarity bias.  The most 
impactful result lies with DUAL_SWITCHit, it is positive and highly significant across all four 
specifications.  It appears as if familiarity bias is most pronounced when there is a new auditor 
from a different locale than the original auditor.   
Interestingly and despite the fact that AUDITOR_SWITCHit is positive in all cases and significant 
in one of them, DUAL_SWITCHit, aside from being statistically different from zero is also 
statistically different from AUDITOR_SWITCHit.
14  This suggests that it is the confluence of both 
an auditor change and a change in the auditor locale that impacts familiarity bias the most.  This 
matches our expectations for the setting with the highest level of familiarity bias.  These results 
and test lend support to the main findings in Table 3. 
In Table 6, we conduct several cross-sectional tests to determine if additional settings cause 
familiarity bias on the part of auditors to ebb and flow.  We speculate that familiarity bias is 
diminished when the auditor has extensive prior experience with similar types of client firms.  
Similar types of client firms would most likely be represented by client firms that are in the same 
industry.  As a result, our initial control variable LN_IND_CLIENTSit is an excellent variable to 
interact with SWITCHit.  If industry exposure reduces familiarity bias, we expect this variable to 
                                                 
13 The formulation of these variables essentially breaks the initial variable of interest, SWITCHit, down into two 
components, AUDITOR_SWITCHit and DUAL_SWITCHit.  In our sample of 35,188 observations, 2,923 are coded as 
a one for SWITCHit.  Of these, 1,644 are where the audit firm was replaced by a successor firm in the same city 
(AUDITOR_SWITCHit  = 1) and 1,279 were instances where the audit firm was replaced by a successor firm in a 
different city (DUAL_SWITCHit = 1).  There are also 1,253 observations whereas the audit firm did not change but 
the office location did (OFFICE_SWITCHit = 1). 
14 Chi-squared tests of Columns 1 and 2 support this with chi-squared values of 14.35 and 12.72, respectively.  The 
same can be said for the OLS regressions in Columns 3 and 4, f-tests of DUAL_SWITCHit = AUDITOR_SWITCHit 
result in f-statistics of 31.74 and 30.43, respectively. 
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have a moderating impact upon our main effect that a change in auditor increases the likelihood 
of a going concern opinion. 
In addition to LN_IND_CLIENTSit, we also create to new variable loosely related to 
LN_IND_CLIENTSit to also use in cross-sectional tests.  The first is SPECIALISTit; it is a binary 
variable equal to one if the auditor for an observation has at least 25% of the overall clientele for 
a particular two digit SIC code for a given calendar year.  The second is MKT_SHAREit; it is a 
continuous variable that represents the overall percentage of client firms the auditor services 
within a two digit SIC code for a given calendar year.15  By using these additional variables, we 
obtain a more nuanced cross-sectional examination of familiarity bias in an audit setting. 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
Table 6 has 12 columns, four for each of the three interactions.  Two are probit regressions and 
two are OLS regressions.  Each probit and OLS regression has a version with and without 
industry and time period fixed effects.  Columns 1 through 6 are the probit regressions and 
Columns 7 through 12 are the OLS regressions.  All controls from Table 3 have been employed 
but their output has been suppressed to make Table 6 easier to read and more parsimonious.   
The interaction terms are negative and significant in 10 of the 12 specifications.  The only 
Columns not achieving statistical significance are Columns 3 and 4 whereas SPECIALISTit was 
interacted with SWITCHit in a probit specification.
16  This interaction is highly significant in the 
OLS regressions, though.  In all cases, the negative nature of the coefficients for these interaction 
terms suggests that an auditor with industry expertise or existing clientele within the industry is 
less likely to issue a going concern for a first time audit than is a first time auditor with little or 
no industry experience.  Familiarity bias appears to be higher in those instances.  This further 
supports our underlying theory and the hypothesis initially tested in Table 3. 
E.  Additional Analysis 
If familiarity bias impacts going concern reporting as reported in Tables 3 through 6, it is 
possible that it influences other auditor decision processes.  While the standard auditor reporting 
                                                 
15 While related to LN_IND_CLIENTSit, these variables are not the same construct.  SPECIALISTit correlates with 
LN_IND_CLIENTSit at the 0.108 level and MKT_SHAREit correlates with LN_IND_CLIENTSit at the 0.515 level. 
16 This is not entirely surprising given the coarse nature of this variable.  Measuring industry specialization has been 
heavily debated with auditing research. 
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model (i.e., unmodified opinion, adverse opinion, disclaimer of opinion) is not palatable for 
public company reporting purposes and does not give rise to cross sectional differences for 
empirical testing, other requirements of the financial reporting process may do so.  One such 
setting is Section 404 reporting and the requirement that auditors must place an opinion on the 
audit client’s internal control processes and effectiveness.  Internal control is a much more 
“gray” area than financial reporting, giving rise to even greater auditor discretion.  This 
discretion could possibly allow auditor bias, through familiarity bias, to manifest itself. 
To explore this notion we employ our primary econometric model from Table 3.  However, we 
remove going concern opinions (GCit) as the dependent variable and replace it with another 
binary variable, IC_INEFFECTIVEit.
17  IC_INEFFECTIVEit equals a one if the auditor deemed 
the client’s internal control to be ineffective for the reporting period.  It is also possible that the 
auditor has the discretion to cite more than one weakness in internal control.  We thus modify the 
econometric specification to incorporate a count variable, IC_WEAKNESS_COUNTit, as the 
dependent variable.  We expect a change in auditor and the increased lack of familiarity that 
comes with such a change to function similar in this econometric specification to that of Table 3.  
SWITCHit should be positively related to ineffective internal controls, both in existence and 
magnitude.  Table 7 details this analysis. 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 reperform the model of Table 3 with IC_INEFFECTIVEit as the 
dependent variable using probit regression.  Columns 3 and 4 replicate these using OLS regression.  
Columns 2 and 4 employ industry and time period fixed effects via indicator variables.  Columns 
5 and 6 utilize IC_WEAKNESS_COUNTit as the dependent variable and use Poisson regression as 
a result. 
Across all specifications, SWITCHit is positive and highly statistically significant, despite the much 
lower explanatory power (i.e., lower r-squared) values of these models.  This lends further support 
to the notion that familiarity bias impacts auditor reporting decisions.   
These results have substantial economic impact.  An average marginal effects analysis for 
Columns 1 and 2 results in average marginal effects coefficients of 0.019 and 0.020, respectively. 
                                                 
17 We also make GCit a control variable for these analyses. 
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Since ineffective internal controls appear in only 2.8% of the sample, a first year audit raises the 
unconditional probability significantly at 67.8% (1.9% / 2.8%) and 71.4% (2.0% / 2.8%) for 
Columns 1 and 2, respectively.  The results for Columns 5 and 6 also further support this story; 
the number of internal control weaknesses also appears to be heavily influenced by an auditor’s 
familiarity bias. 
We also perform several untabulated analyses.  In rendering an opinion that internal controls are 
ineffective, the auditor has several routes with which to make that determination.  One route would 
be the judgment that the client simply misapplied the appropriate financial reporting framework.  
Another would result from an incident of fraud or deliberate misrepresentations on the part of 
management.  A third route would be that internal control is simply not properly designed, 
resulting in a lack of separation of duties.  The Audit Analytics database codes instances where 
internal control has been ineffective along these three dimensions.18  We thus create three 
additional binary variables, RULE_FAILUREit, FRAUD_IRREGit,and IC_WEAKit to capture these 
variables, respectively.  We then reperform Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 with each of these as 
dependent variables. 
The results overwhelmingly support the notion that a change in auditor positively impacts the 
instance of misapplication of the financial reporting framework (RULE_FAILUREit) and a flaw in 
internal control systems (IC_WEAKit) as all coefficients are positive and highly significant from a 
statistical standpoint (p-value < 0.01).  However, fraud and other financial reporting irregularities 
(FRAUD_IRREGit) does not attain a result.  We interpret these results as supporting our findings 
in Table 7, the two instances with results in this analysis are most likely the two with the most 
auditor judgment.  Furthermore, an auditor would not likely accuse a client of fraud unless it is 
essentially clear from the facts before them.  The uncertainty of how accounting rules are applied 
and whether internal control systems are adequate would give enough leeway for auditor 
familiarity bias to potentially manifest in rendering an opinion that overall internal control is 
ineffective.  
IV. Additional Robustness Tests 
                                                 
18 An observation with ineffective internal control could have one of these or all of them as underlying reasons for 
ineffective control. 
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A.  Fixed Effects Models 
We further explore our results with a heightened level of econometric rigor and introduce auditor 
fixed effects to our analysis in Table 3.  Auditor fixed effects allow us, in theory, to control for 
invariant auditor traits, including the propensity to issue a going concern report.  We first replicate 
Columns 2 through 5 of Table 3, employing an indicator variable for each audit firm. 
When this is performed, the results of Table continue to hold.  For instance, the coefficients of 
SWITCHit for Columns 2 and 3 become 0.145 and 0.162, respectively, and remain statistically 
significant at the p-value <0.01 level.19  The same pattern holds for the replication of Columns 4 
and 5 (OLS regressions).  Our primary results are thus robust to the inclusion of auditor fixed 
effects. 
We also replicate these analyses with the inclusion of audit client firm fixed effects to control for 
latent invariant traits at the client-firm level.  The results for Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 continue 
to hold, the coefficients of SWITCHit become 0.170 and 0.179, respectively and retain statistical 
significance at the p-value <0.10 level.20  Replication of Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 using audit 
client firm fixed effects also hold with positive coefficients that are statistically significant at the 
p-value < 0.05 levels.  Overall, these fixed effects analyses support the notion that latent and 
endogenous traits at either the auditor level or the audit client level are not driving our primary 
results within this manuscript. 
B. Lagged Versions of the Dependent Variable 
Another robustness analysis we conduct is to re-perform our main analysis in Table 3 with the 
prior year’s value for GCit, as an additional control variable.  While this type of econometric 
specification is not common in research whereas going concern opinion outcomes are the 
dependent variable, we perform this robustness analysis for a couple of reasons.  First of all, 
financially distressed firms tend to be distressed for long periods of time.  Second, the issuance of 
a going concern opinion in the prior year likely makes it easier for an auditor to issue one in the 
current year, especially if the current year auditor is a new one.  Prior literature has identified some 
evidence that the issuance of a going concern report may lead to a subsequent change in an auditor 
                                                 
19 These analyses do cause a small drop in sample size as the dependent variable is invariant for some auditors. 
20 The sample size drops dramatically for these tests as many audit client firms never experience a going concern 
report modification.  The sample size drops to 4,130 audit client firm-year observations. 
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(Carey et al. 2008).  Consecutive going concern opinion modification issuances have been 
associated with audit firms’ lack of available knowledge and resources (Harris, Omer, and Wong 
2019).  By controlling for a prior going concern opinions, we control for this potential threat to 
our research design.  This adds an additional layer of rigor above and beyond the extensive amount 
of controls already in place in our research design to control for the client-firm’s level of financial 
distress. 
We replicate Table 3 (untabulated) with the inclusion of the prior year’s going concern opinion.  
For Columns 2 and 3, SWITCHit continues to display positive coefficients (0.161 and 0.191, 
respectively) which are both highly significant at the p-value < 0.01 level.  The same holds for 
replication of Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 (OLS regressions), the coeffcients also remain positive 
and are also statistically significant at the p-value < 0.01 level.  As expected and throughout these 
four regressions, the coefficient for GCit-1 is positive and highly significant, indicating substantial 
serial correlation in going concern behavior on the part of auditors.21  An average marginal effects 
analysis reveals that a going concern opinion in the prior year raises the likelihood of one in the 
current year by 9.6%, a very substantial effect. 
C. Drop Initial Observations 
In our original coding for the dataset, we retained all observations for which it was the first year 
in the Compustat dataset (i.e., ipo and spinoff firms) but coded these with SWITCHit equaling zero.  
While many of these firms likely retain their original auditor, it is impossible to determine if that 
is the case or not.  We thus conduct a robustness analysis dropping these observations from the 
overall dataset.  When this is performed, our overall inferences remain unchanged throughout our 
analyses. 
D. Two-Way Clustering 
Our main econometric specification clusters the standard errors at the client-firm level.  This was 
done since the depth of our panel is not very long (Petersen 2009).  However, we do replicate our 
main findings utilizing two way clustering over the time and audit client firm dimensions, both 
                                                 
21 For instance, in a replication of Column 3 of Table 3, the coefficient for GCit-1 is 1.928 and has a z-statistic of 
35.49.   
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with and without the time period dummy control variables.  When this is performed, all of our 
inferences remain unchanged. 
E. Going Concern Error Rates 
While it is not a central feature of our manuscript, prior literature has focused heavily on going 
concern error rates (i.e., issuing a going concern when one was not warranted and no subsequent 
bankruptcy occurred or not issuing a going concern when one was warranted and evidence exists 
of subsequent business failure) by typically limiting the sample to distressed or bankrupt firms.  
While a comprehensive bankruptcy database does not exist for the breadth of our sample (2008 – 
2017), we employ a proxy measure to identify firms most at risk for business failure.  First we 
identify, by two digit SIC code, client firm-years that are in the upper one third in terms of financial 
leverage and in the lower one third in terms of the current ratio and the market to book ratio.  These 
are preliminary markers of financial distress.  We then code the identified observations meeting 
these three criteria as “distressed” if that particular client firm goes “dark” within the next year.22   
After identifying these “distressed” observations, we then code two types of going concern errors.  
We call the first a type I error, not receiving a going concern opinion when our metric for distress 
suggests one should be in place.  We call the second error a type II error and it occurs when a 
going concern opinion is issued but one does not appear to be warranted by our measure of distress. 
Within our sample, this results in 198 type I errors and 1,972 type II errors.  Type II errors appear 
to be much more prevalent and are likely due the propensity of a going concern to insulate the 
auditor from unwanted litigation, etc.  Our documented phenomena thus far in the paper would 
support this notion. 
When then take these two error variables and use them as the dependent variable in the econometric 
models of Table 3.  When this is done, SWITCHit is positive and statistically significant for the 
regressions involving our type II error variable; they are statistically insignificant for our type I 
                                                 
22 We define going “dark” has not having a subsequent observations in the Compustat dataset.  Firms that go “dark” 
either 1) went private, 2) were acquired, 3) went bankrupt, or 4) were delisted from public exchanges.  While not all 
of these outcomes might be the result of a going concern issue, typically bankruptcy, delisting and many acquisitions 
are driven by the fact that the subject firm is heavily distressed.  Taking a firm private can also be the result of going 
concern pressures as management attempts to alleviate the firm from pressures that come with being a public 
company while they attempt to execute a turn-around plan.   
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error variable.  This further supports the notion that auditors are being more cautious in their first 
year of an engagement; familiarity bias appears to be having an impact. 
V. Conclusion 
In this manuscript, we explore whether familiarity bias manifests beyond the realm of investors 
and has an influential impact upon an important information intermediary and monitor, auditors.  
For a choice of setting, we employ going concern audit opinions for empirical testing.  This 
setting is an excellent avenue to test familiarity bias since auditors have a great deal of discretion 
in terms of when they can issue a going concern opinion. 
Our primary tests indicate that familiarity bias does impact auditors.  Auditors are more likely to 
issue a going concern opinion in their initial year with a client, a time at which their familiarity 
bias is likely the highest.  This phenomenon appears to slowly dissipate over a period of 
approximately five years as the auditor becomes more acclimated to the client.  It also appears to 
be moderated in situations whereas the auditor is more likely to already be familiar with the 
client.  Such situations include instances where the auditor already has extensive industry 
exposure or expertise.    Further supporting our familiarity bias hypothesis, our main effect is the 
strongest when the successor auditor comes from a different locale than the previous auditor.  
Our primary finding also extends to Section 404 internal control reporting; auditors are more 
likely to cite ineffective internal control s when they are unfamiliar with a client. 
These results are robust to numerous client level financial controls, differing econometric models 
and specifications and different ways to compute standard errors.  They are also robust to auditor 
and client-level fixed effects analyses, as well as the inclusion of the prior period’s going 
concern decision as an additional control variable in the econometric specification.    In further 
testing, it appears as if changes in auditors are primarily driving excessive going concern 
behavior but leading to increases in instances where a going concern should have been issued but 
was not.   
Overall, these findings should be of interest and use to several parties.  To the users of financial 
reports, we reveal a previous undisclosed form of bias in those reports.  To auditors, we may 
make them more conscious of the biases that dictate their decision patterns.  To academics, we 
25 
 
continue a lengthy and robust stream of literature in regard to familiarity bias and how it impacts 
the economic decisions of individuals.
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APPENDIX 
GCit Binary variable equal to one if the auditor client firm-year received 
a going concern modification to its annual initial audit report, zero 
otherwise.  Obtained from form 10-K, 10-K405, 10KSB, 10KSB40, 
or 10-KT in the Audit Analytics database (variable = 
GoingConcern). 
SWITCHit Binary variable equal to one if the auditor differs from the prior year 
auditor within the Audit Analytics database (variable = AuditorKey), 
zero otherwise. Initial observations for a firm-year are coded as a 
zero since an actual change in auditor is not observed. 
LN_AGEit Continuous variable equal to the natural log of the difference 
between the calendar year of the observation and the calendar year 
of the observation’s initial public offering (Compustat variable 
ipodate) plus one. 
LN_ATit Continuous variable equal to the natural log of the observation’s 
total assets (Compustat variable at). 
ABNORMAL_FEES_PCTit Continuous variable equal to the difference between total predicted 
fees (both audit and non-audit fees, Audit Analytics variable 
TotalFees) and actual total fees, divided by actual total fees.  
Predicted total fees calculated using linear regression with total fees 
as the dependent variable and all other covariates as predictor 
variables. 
CLIENT_IMPORTANCEit Continuous variable equal to the total fees (Audit Analytics variable 
TotalFees) for the audit client for the year divided by the sum of the 
total fees for all audit client firms of the auditor for the calendar year. 
LEVERAGEit Continuous variable equal to total liabilities (Compustat variable lt) 
divided by total assets (Compustat variable at). 
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LOSSit Binary variable equal to one if net income (Compustat variable ni) 
is negative, zero otherwise. 
ROAit Continuous variable equal to net income before special items 
(Compustat variables ni and spi) divided by total assets (Compustat 
variable at). 
INT_COVERAGEit Continuous variable equal to interest expense (Compustat variable 
xint) divided by net income before interest and taxes (Compustat 
variables ni, txt, and xint). 
GROWTHit Continuous variable equal to the current year revenues (Compustat 
variable revt) minus the prior year revenues, divided by prior year 
revenues. 
CURRENT_RATIOit Continuous variable equal to current assets (Compustat variable act) 
divided by current liabilities (Compustat variable lct). 
MKTBKit Continuous variable equal to the market value of assets (Compustat 
variable mkvalt + Compustat variable lt) divided by the book value 
of assets (Compustat variable at). 
ALTMANit Continuous variable equal to the observation’s Altman Z-Score, as 
promulgated by Altman (1968). 
INVESTMENTSit Continuous variable equal to the observations cash and short term 
investments (Compustat variable che) divided by total assets 
(Compustat variable at). 
BIGNit Binary variable equal to one if the observation’s auditor is one of 
the “big four” audit firms (i.e., Deloitte, EY, PWC, or KPMG).  
Derived from Audit Analytics variable AuditorKey. 
IC_INEFFECTIVEit Binary variable equal to one if the observation’s auditor deemed 
internal controls to be ineffective (Audit Analytics variable 
EffectiveInternalControls), zero otherwise. 
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LN_IND_CLIENTSit Continuous variable equal to the natural log of the number of audit 
clients that the observation’s auditor serviced in that given calendar 
year. 
FIRST_YEARit Binary variable equal to one if the observation is the initial year of 
an auditor client relationship, zero otherwise.  Equivalent to 
SWITCHit. 
SECOND_YEARit Binary variable equal to one if the observation is the second year of 
an auditor client relationship, zero otherwise. 
THIRD_FOURTH_YEARit Binary variable equal to one if the observation is the third or fourth 
year of an auditor client relationship, zero otherwise. 
FIFTH_SIXTH_YEARit Binary variable equal to one if the observation is the fifth or sixth 
year of an auditor client relationship, zero otherwise. 
AUDITOR_SWITCHit Binary variable equal to one if the observation’s audit firm (Audit 
Analytics variable AuditorKey) is different from the prior year, but 
the new auditor is from the same locale (city) (Audit Analytics 
variable AuditorCity), zero otherwise. 
OFFICE_SWITCHit Binary variable equal to one if the observation’s audit firm (Audit 
Analytics variable AuditorKey) is same as the prior year, but the 
audit team or partner is from a different locale (city) (Audit 
Analytics variable AuditorCity) than the prior year, zero otherwise. 
DUAL_SWITCHit Binary variable equal to one if the observation’s audit firm (Audit 
Analytics variable AuditorKey) is different from the prior year and 
the audit team or partner is from a different locale (city) (Audit 
Analytics variable AuditorCity) than the prior year, zero otherwise. 
SPECIALISTit Binary variable equal to one if the observation’s audit firm has at 
least 25% of the audit clientele for the particular two digit SIC code 
for the calendar year, zero otherwise. 
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MKT_SHAREit Continuous variable equal to the percentage, for a given calendar 
year, of the number of audit clients within the two digit SIC code of 
the observation’s auditor relative to the total audit clients within the 
same two digit SIC code for the same calendar year. 
IC_WEAKNESS_COUNTit Count variable equal to the number of identified internal control 
weakness for the observation (Audit Analytics variable 
InternalControlNumberWeakness). 
RULE_FAILUREit Binary variable equal to one if the observation’s audit firm deemed 
an internal control weakness to be the result of the misapplication of 
the pertinent financial reporting framework (e.g., GAAP, IFRS) 
(Audit Analytics variable AccountingRuleGAAPFASBAppl), zero 
otherwise. 
FRAUD_IRREGit Binary variable equal to one if the observation’s audit firm deemed 
an internal control weakness to be the result of fraud or other 
accounting “irregularities” (Audit Analytics variable 
FinancialFraudIrregularities), zero otherwise. 
IC_WEAKit Binary variable equal to one if the observation’s audit firm deemed 
an internal control weakness to be the result of an absence or 
breakdown in internal control (e.g., separation of duties) (Audit 
Analytics variable InternalControlWeakness), zero otherwise. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample of 35,188 firm-year observations. The sample period begins with firm-years ending in calendar year 
2008 and ends with all firm-years ending in calendar year 2017. All continuous variables have been winsorized at the 0.01 and 0.99 levels and are defined in the 
Appendix.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SWITCH  = 0 SWITCH  = 1
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Mean Difference
GC 0.092 0.000 0.289 0.081 0.220 -0.139 -25.181 ***
SWITCH 0.083 0.000 0.276 n/a n/a n/a n/a
LN_AGE 2.568 2.773 0.847 2.583 2.401 0.182 11.157 ***
LN_AT 6.036 6.340 2.654 6.188 4.251 1.937 36.514 ***
ABNORMAL_FEES_PCT 0.157 0.010 0.676 0.153 0.225 -0.072 -5.549 ***
CLIENT_IMPORTANCE 0.042 0.001 0.135 0.039 0.071 -0.032 -12.029 ***
LEVERAGE 0.835 0.589 1.592 0.805 1.171 -0.366 -11.917 ***
LOSS 0.360 0.000 0.480 0.347 0.505 -0.158 -17.050 ***
ROA -0.214 0.012 1.066 -0.183 -0.556 0.373 18.183 ***
INT_COVERAGE 0.018 0.140 0.696 0.146 0.069 0.077 5.701 ***
GROWTH 0.180 0.045 0.859 0.169 0.296 -0.127 -7.637 ***
CURRENT_RATIO 1.449 2.370 2.678 2.373 2.34 0.033 0.642
MKTBK 3.053 1.375 7.165 2.907 4.667 -1.76 -12.746 ***
ALTMAN -1.138 1.649 24.626 -0.599 -7.089 6.49 13.680 ***
INVESTMENTS 0.184 0.088 0.227 0.183 0.193 -0.010 -2.358 **
BIGN 0.560 1.000 0.496 0.593 0.190 0.403 43.096 ***
IC_INEFFECTIVE 0.028 0.000 0.166 0.027 0.045 -0.018 -5.791 ***
LN_IND_CLIENTS 2.421 2.639 1.514 2.496 1.601 0.895 31.018 ***
T-Stat
(7)
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Table 2: Univariate Correlation Matrix 
Table 2, presents a pairwise correlation coefficient matrix for the full sample of 35,188 firm-year observations within our primary sample. All variables are defined 
in the Appendix.  All statistically significant relations (p-value < 0.10) are denoted in bold and italics. 
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GC 1.000
SWITCH 0.133 1.000
LN_AGE -0.124 -0.059 1.000
LN_AT -0.511 -0.191 0.222 1.000
ABNORMAL_FEES_PCT -0.069 0.030 -0.029 0.004 1.000
CLIENT_IMPORTANCE 0.116 0.064 -0.022 -0.251 0.047 1.000
LEVERAGE 0.495 0.063 -0.054 -0.351 -0.140 0.069 1.000
LOSS 0.378 0.091 -0.200 -0.464 0.011 0.054 0.193 1.000
ROA -0.570 -0.097 0.129 0.485 0.133 -0.073 -0.789 -0.336 1.000
INT_COVERAGE -0.146 -0.030 0.012 0.193 0.007 -0.023 -0.087 -0.196 0.125 1.000
GROWTH 0.080 0.041 -0.172 -0.101 0.024 0.025 0.003 0.070 -0.062 -0.027 1.000
CURRENT_RATIO -0.161 -0.003 -0.050 -0.158 0.116 0.019 -0.228 0.067 0.112 -0.071 0.040 1.000
MKTBK 0.428 0.068 -0.107 -0.433 -0.098 0.052 0.656 0.206 -0.686 -0.109 0.080 -0.063 1.000
ALTMAN -0.522 -0.073 0.034 0.391 0.159 -0.065 -0.841 -0.254 0.819 0.089 0.007 0.261 -0.547 1.000
INVESTMENTS 0.050 0.013 -0.173 -0.360 -0.034 -0.008 -0.027 0.276 -0.123 -0.147 0.093 0.547 0.189 0.001 1.000
BIGN -0.266 -0.222 0.099 0.548 -0.060 -0.341 -0.173 -0.180 0.215 0.060 -0.053 -0.005 -0.158 0.188 -0.006 1.000
IC_INEFFECTIVE -0.010 0.031 0.001 0.024 0.017 -0.016 -0.018 0.035 0.019 -0.008 0.009 -0.007 -0.014 0.018 -0.011 0.021 1.000
LN_IND_CLIENTS -0.280 -0.163 0.014 0.482 -0.048 -0.415 -0.180 -0.161 0.209 0.091 -0.029 0.010 -0.173 0.186 0.058 0.575 0.032 1.000
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Table 3: Primary Hypothesis Tests 
Table 3 presents the results of our primary hypothesis test. The variable of interest in this table is SWITCHit, and the 
dependent variable is GCit. Columns 1 through 3 employ probit regression and columns 4 and 5 employ OLS 
regression.  Column 1 omits SWITCHit to show the results without the variable of interest. Columns 2 and 4 do not 
include industry and time period fixed effects while Columns 3 and 5 do.  All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Robust two-tailed z and t-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GC GC GC GC GC
SWITCH 0.201*** 0.229*** 0.030*** 0.031***
(5.138) (5.760) (5.380) (5.598)
LN_AGE -0.111*** -0.108*** -0.115*** -0.002 -0.003
(-4.541) (-4.429) (-4.583) (-0.721) (-1.528)
LN_AT -0.287*** -0.286*** -0.337*** -0.032*** -0.034***
(-16.821) (-16.700) (-17.347) (-22.105) (-21.988)
ABNORMAL_FEES_PCT 0.004 -0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.136) (-0.014) (0.055) (-0.710) (-0.710)
CLIENT_IMPORTANCE -0.006 0.003 -0.086 -0.004 -0.023
(-0.044) (0.020) (-0.644) (-0.226) (-1.153)
LEVERAGE 0.155*** 0.157*** 0.169*** 0.012*** 0.014***
(3.183) (3.211) (3.583) (3.398) (3.866)
LOSS 0.914*** 0.911*** 0.956*** 0.083*** 0.075***
(19.278) (19.188) (18.062) (19.823) (17.930)
ROA -0.325*** -0.325*** -0.266*** -0.065*** -0.062***
(-5.873) (-5.820) (-5.317) (-13.097) (-12.755)
INT_COVERAGE -0.039** -0.038** -0.038** -0.013*** -0.013***
(-2.273) (-2.232) (-2.168) (-5.980) (-5.578)
GROWTH 0.024* 0.023* 0.016 0.011*** 0.009***
(1.927) (1.842) (1.247) (4.902) (3.980)
CURRENT_RATIO -0.127*** -0.126*** -0.136*** -0.013*** -0.015***
(-6.182) (-6.154) (-6.078) (-13.698) (-14.102)
MKTBK -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** 0.001 0.000
(-2.217) (-2.235) (-2.381) (1.305) (0.948)
ALTMAN -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001***
(-1.157) (-1.151) (-0.577) (-3.303) (-2.919)
INVESTMENTS -0.571*** -0.562*** -0.608*** -0.084*** -0.086***
(-5.240) (-5.145) (-5.136) (-6.554) (-6.243)
BIGN 0.122** 0.145** 0.270*** 0.021*** 0.035***
(2.038) (2.406) (3.834) (5.282) (6.371)
IC_INEFFECTIVE 0.303*** 0.292*** 0.319*** -0.007 -0.007
(3.603) (3.473) (3.576) (-0.795) (-0.790)
LN_IND_CLIENTS -0.044** -0.043** -0.072*** -0.008*** -0.016***
(-2.296) (-2.224) (-2.794) (-5.883) (-5.533)
Model Probit Probit Probit OLS OLS
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE's No No Yes No Yes
Year FE's No No Yes No Yes
N 35,188 35,188 35,188 35,188 35,188
R-squared 0.569 0.570 0.590 0.449 0.460
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Table 4: Analyses over Time 
Table 4 modifies the tests of Table 3 to identify trends over time. The variables of interest in this table are 
FIRST_YEARit, SECOND_YEARit, THIRD_FOURTH_YEARit and FIFTH_SIXTH_YEARit. Columns 1 and 2 employ 
probit regression and columns 3 and 4 employ OLS regression.  Columns 1 and 3 do not include industry and time 
period fixed effects while Columns 2 and 4 do.  All variables are defined in the Appendix. Robust two-tailed z and t-
statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GC GC GC GC
FIRST_YEAR 0.126** 0.182*** 0.011* 0.011*
(2.153) (3.061) (1.840) (1.899)
SECOND_YEAR 0.087 0.144** 0.007 0.007
(1.487) (2.393) (1.358) (1.243)
THIRD_FOURTH_YEAR 0.044 0.077 -0.001 -0.001
(0.822) (1.413) (-0.125) (-0.246)
FIFTH_SIXTH_YEAR -0.039 -0.024 -0.014*** -0.013***
(-0.719) (-0.436) (-3.609) (-3.230)
LN_AGE -0.089*** -0.085*** -0.000 -0.002
(-3.274) (-3.081) (-0.150) (-0.847)
LN_AT -0.286*** -0.337*** -0.033*** -0.034***
(-16.680) (-17.319) (-22.268) (-22.107)
ABNORMAL_FEES_PCT 0.003 0.006 -0.002 -0.002
(0.112) (0.194) (-0.624) (-0.621)
CLIENT_IMPORTANCE 0.004 -0.081 -0.005 -0.025
(0.028) (-0.607) (-0.276) (-1.214)
LEVERAGE 0.155*** 0.168*** 0.012*** 0.014***
(3.167) (3.527) (3.375) (3.840)
LOSS 0.915*** 0.961*** 0.084*** 0.075***
(19.310) (18.189) (19.923) (18.027)
ROA -0.326*** -0.267*** -0.065*** -0.062***
(-5.836) (-5.322) (-13.107) (-12.771)
INT_COVERAGE -0.038** -0.038** -0.013*** -0.012***
(-2.238) (-2.170) (-5.933) (-5.547)
GROWTH 0.023* 0.014 0.011*** 0.009***
(1.777) (1.127) (4.869) (3.958)
CURRENT_RATIO -0.127*** -0.137*** -0.013*** -0.015***
(-6.173) (-6.104) (-13.738) (-14.135)
MKTBK -0.008** -0.008** 0.001 0.000
(-2.218) (-2.350) (1.244) (0.905)
ALTMAN -0.002 -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001***
(-1.181) (-0.619) (-3.345) (-2.951)
INVESTMENTS -0.564*** -0.608*** -0.084*** -0.086***
(-5.164) (-5.129) (-6.594) (-6.270)
BIGN 0.142** 0.279*** 0.018*** 0.033***
(2.349) (3.952) (4.664) (5.883)
IC_INEFFECTIVE 0.297*** 0.324*** -0.006 -0.005
(3.549) (3.648) (-0.646) (-0.627)
0.000 0.000 0.518 0.531
LN_IND_CLIENTS -0.043** -0.072*** -0.008*** -0.016***
(-2.208) (-2.807) (-5.867) (-5.568)
0.027 0.005 0.000 0.000
Model Probit Probit OLS OLS
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE's No Yes No Yes
Year FE's No Yes No Yes
N 35,188 35,188 35,188 35,188
R-squared 0.569 0.590 0.449 0.460
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Table 5: Changes in Auditor and Auditor Location 
Table 5 modifies the tests of Table 3 to identify whether familiarity bias is influenced by the auditor’s location. The 
variables of interest in this table are AUDITOR_SWITCHit, OFFICE_SWITCHit, and DUAL_SWITCHit. Columns 1 
and 2 employ probit regression and columns 3 and 4 employ OLS regression.  Columns 1 and 3 do not include industry 
and time period fixed effects while Columns 2 and 4 do.  All variables are defined in the Appendix. Robust two-tailed 
z and t-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GC GC GC GC
AUDITOR_SWITCH 0.063 0.096* 0.002 0.004
(1.174) (1.738) (0.279) (0.567)
OFFICE_SWITCH 0.033 0.058 -0.003 -0.002
(0.450) (0.786) (-0.457) (-0.322)
DUAL_SWITCH 0.345*** 0.367*** 0.068*** 0.068***
(6.286) (6.635) (7.067) (7.118)
LN_AGE -0.106*** -0.113*** -0.001 -0.003
(-4.329) (-4.496) (-0.580) (-1.398)
LN_AT -0.285*** -0.335*** -0.032*** -0.034***
(-16.635) (-17.268) (-22.092) (-21.956)
ABNORMAL_FEES_PCT -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(-0.217) (-0.131) (-0.933) (-0.924)
CLIENT_IMPORTANCE -0.000 -0.087 -0.005 -0.024
(-0.000) (-0.651) (-0.262) (-1.164)
LEVERAGE 0.157*** 0.170*** 0.012*** 0.014***
(3.209) (3.581) (3.390) (3.863)
LOSS 0.911*** 0.956*** 0.083*** 0.075***
(19.145) (18.018) (19.836) (17.936)
ROA -0.324*** -0.265*** -0.064*** -0.061***
(-5.770) (-5.272) (-12.967) (-12.632)
INT_COVERAGE -0.038** -0.038** -0.013*** -0.012***
(-2.235) (-2.174) (-5.943) (-5.540)
GROWTH 0.022* 0.015 0.011*** 0.009***
(1.735) (1.153) (4.808) (3.884)
CURRENT_RATIO -0.126*** -0.137*** -0.013*** -0.015***
(-6.140) (-6.068) (-13.667) (-14.067)
MKTBK -0.008** -0.009** 0.001 0.000
(-2.317) (-2.441) (1.263) (0.909)
ALTMAN -0.002 -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001***
(-1.179) (-0.604) (-3.373) (-2.990)
INVESTMENTS -0.559*** -0.604*** -0.083*** -0.086***
(-5.122) (-5.106) (-6.541) (-6.237)
BIGN 0.141** 0.264*** 0.020*** 0.034***
(2.330) (3.749) (5.101) (6.184)
IC_INEFFECTIVE 0.289*** 0.316*** -0.007 -0.007
(3.426) (3.527) (-0.791) (-0.786)
LN_IND_CLIENTS -0.042** -0.071*** -0.008*** -0.016***
(-2.161) (-2.738) (-5.770) (-5.429)
Model Probit Probit OLS OLS
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE's No Yes No Yes
Year FE's No Yes No Yes
N 35,188 35,188 35,188 35,188
R-squared 0.570 0.591 0.450 0.461
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Table 6: Cross-sectional Tests 
Table 6 conducts several cross sectional tests for situations where familiarity bias would be more or less pronounced. The variables of interest in this table are the 
interaction terms.   Columns 1 through 6 employ probit regression while columns 7 through 12 employ OLS regression. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Robust two-tailed z and t-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
GC GC GC GC GC GC GC GC GC GC GC GC
SWITCH 0.266*** 0.310*** 0.209*** 0.236*** 0.258*** 0.290*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.053*** 0.054***
(4.786) (5.490) (5.310) (5.889) (5.113) (5.619) (6.308) (6.341) (5.731) (5.976) (6.594) (6.697)
SWITCH_x_LN_IND_CLIENTS -0.054* -0.067** -0.020*** -0.019***
(-1.745) (-2.183) (-5.408) (-5.268)
SWITCH_x_SPECIALIST -0.365 -0.447 -0.059*** -0.066***
(-1.025) (-1.208) (-2.939) (-3.187)
SWITCH_x_MKT_SHARE -1.239* -1.435* -0.354*** -0.353***
(-1.695) (-1.901) (-5.464) (-5.451)
LN_IND_CLIENTS -0.036* -0.063** -0.007*** -0.014***
(-1.782) (-2.365) (-4.731) (-4.876)
SPECIALIST 0.158* 0.081 0.007** 0.005
(1.756) (0.785) (1.961) (0.881)
MKT_SHARE 0.616* 0.264 0.005 -0.031
(1.690) (0.641) (0.268) (-1.346)
Model Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE's No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year FE's No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 35,188 35,188 35,188 35,188 35,188 35,188 35,188 35,188 35,188 35,188 35,188 35,188
R-squared 0.570 0.590 0.569 0.589 0.569 0.589 0.450 0.461 0.448 0.458 0.449 0.459
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Table 7: Analysis of Internal Control Weaknesses 
Table 7 conducts several tests to determine if internal control reporting mimics going concern reporting.  SWTICHit is 
the variable of interest in these tables.   Columns 1 and 2 employ probit regression and Columns 3 and 4 employ OLS 
regression. Columns 5 and 6 utilize Poisson regression as the dependent variable for those columns takes the form of 
a count variable.  All variables are defined in the Appendix. Robust two-tailed z and t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IC_INEFFECTIVE IC_INEFFECTIVE IC_INEFFECTIVE IC_INEFFECTIVE IC_WEAKNESS_COUNT IC_WEAKNESS_COUNT
SWITCH 0.307*** 0.322*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.822*** 0.855***
(6.760) (7.062) (5.488) (5.687) (5.528) (5.657)
LN_AGE 0.007 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.027 -0.046
(0.339) (-0.032) (0.354) (0.174) (-0.358) (-0.602)
LN_AT 0.037*** 0.044*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.113*** 0.144***
(3.589) (3.742) (3.555) (3.625) (2.879) (3.236)
ABNORMAL_FEES_PCT 0.048* 0.054** 0.003* 0.003* -0.218* -0.206
(1.896) (2.123) (1.780) (1.806) (-1.721) (-1.638)
CLIENT_IMPORTANCE -0.239 -0.015 -0.010* 0.003 -0.573 -0.229
(-1.643) (-0.102) (-1.657) (0.389) (-1.437) (-0.566)
LEVERAGE -0.023 -0.014 -0.000 -0.000 -0.058 -0.032
(-0.821) (-0.512) (-0.342) (-0.010) (-0.712) (-0.405)
LOSS 0.305*** 0.281*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.989*** 0.904***
(7.996) (7.127) (7.276) (6.609) (7.417) (6.379)
ROA 0.070 0.069 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.085 0.078
(1.602) (1.580) (2.582) (2.651) (0.656) (0.626)
INT_COVERAGE -0.023 -0.014 -0.002 -0.001 -0.025 -0.011
(-1.195) (-0.701) (-1.128) (-0.617) (-0.533) (-0.237)
GROWTH 0.030** 0.029** 0.002* 0.002* 0.070** 0.079**
(2.231) (2.089) (1.853) (1.700) (2.168) (2.383)
CURRENT_RATIO -0.006 -0.013 -0.000 -0.001 -0.020 -0.033
(-0.752) (-1.464) (-0.685) (-1.473) (-0.705) (-1.040)
MKTBK 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.014
(1.461) (1.195) (1.380) (1.335) (1.416) (1.053)
ALTMAN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.008
(0.067) (0.112) (0.032) (0.029) (1.589) (1.498)
INVESTMENTS -0.120 -0.195 -0.008 -0.013** -0.703* -0.949**
(-1.082) (-1.631) (-1.330) (-2.010) (-1.805) (-2.431)
BIGN 0.086* -0.076 0.006* -0.004 0.303** -0.042
(1.810) (-1.281) (1.915) (-0.976) (1.964) (-0.208)
GC -0.043 -0.042 -0.004 -0.004 0.380 0.418
(-0.549) (-0.517) (-0.795) (-0.789) (1.457) (1.572)
LN_IND_CLIENTS -0.012 0.066*** -0.001 0.004*** -0.023 0.091
(-0.819) (2.700) (-0.818) (2.681) (-0.441) (1.100)
Model Probit Probit OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE's No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year FE's No Yes No Yes No Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 35,188 35,188 35,188 35,188 35,188 35,188
R-Squared 0.021 0.047 0.006 0.012 0.005 0.009
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